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Abstract
The New Keynesian model with rational expectations unrealistically
predicts that unanticipated credible changes in the inﬂation target lead to
an immediate jump in the inﬂation level while the output gap is unaﬀected.
We set up a theoretical model where agents learn the behaviour of the
economy. In this context, a permanent change in the inﬂation target leads
inﬂation to respond sluggishly while the output gap is temporarily aﬀected.
We extend the model to allow for both learners and forward looking agents
to coexist. The calibrated model explains quite well transition dynamics
during the Volker disinﬂation.
1 Introduction
The New Keynesian (NK) model with Rational Expectations (RE) became the
workhorse of modern monetary economics. This model allows for a short-run role
of money since ﬁrms do not freely update prices every period. However, the NK
model predicts that an unanticipated fully credible disinﬂation is accomplished
with no output cost and that inﬂation jumps immediately to its new target. Sym-
metrically, if a credible central bank suddenly announces a higher inﬂation target
(which can be interpreted as an expansionary policy), inﬂation is still predicted
to jump immediately to target and output is predicted to be unchanged. These
results are clearly at odds with conventional wisdom; Ball (1995b) shows that
disinﬂations very frequently cause recessions, moreover inﬂation adjusts slowly to
target.
∗I am grateful to my supervisor Albert Marcet, Kosuke Aoki, Jordi Gal´ ı, Massimo Guidolin,
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1We model the disinﬂation as a change in the central bank’s inﬂation target.
We maintain the widely used NK model as our benchmark and we examine how
the model’s predictions change when a proportion of the private sector follows
a learning algorithm. Learning techniques are quite suitable for a disinﬂation
environment, as it is reasonable to expect that the private sector takes time
to understand the economy’s new mechanics. There are two other arguments
that motivate a departure from RE. Firstly, Estrella and Fuher (2003) show
that RE induce counterfactual observations in a general class of macroeconomic
models, which include the NK framework. Secondly, the econometric evidence
from survey expectations suggests that expectations are not fully rational and
usually a backward looking component is found to be present.
We depart from RE and model the private sector to be econometricians, as
it is standard to assume in the learning literature. This learning option seems
more in line with reality where agents only possess limited knowledge about the
economy’s behaviour. The expectation mechanism that we employ has stronger
empirical support than RE, and we show that it reconciles the NK model tran-
sition dynamics with the data. When a disinﬂation is pursued, a recession will
take place while inﬂation is reduced gradually to target. If the inﬂation target is
raised, the economy will experience a temporary boom while inﬂation rises to its
new level. Departing from RE does not introduce additional degrees of freedom
in the model since we impose an endogenous consistency criteria in our learning
mechanism. Besides explaining disinﬂation stylized facts we set the initial and
ﬁnal inﬂation target to match the Volker disinﬂation, making the model dynamics
comparable with the data.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents a brief literature review,
section 3 introduces the theoretical model and the learning mechanism, section
4 evaluates the model under learning, section 5 presents our main model where
learners and forward looking agents coexist, and section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
In the last two decades, RE became the most widely used expectations mech-
anism in economics. Nevertheless, RE assume an amazing knowledge of the
economy, knowledge that in practice economic agents do not possess. Learning,
as in Marcet and Sargent (1989a,b,c), assumes that economic agents behave as
econometricians because they have limited information about the underlying eco-
nomic model. The learning literature was ﬁrst devoted to analyze convergence
properties of learning algorithms. Under certain assumptions it was shown that
the learning equilibrium would converge to RE. Learning was not commonly em-
ployed as an expectations mechanism per se, instead it was seen as a reﬁnement
criteria in models with multiple RE equilibria. The literature has only recently
started to pose learning as an expectation process. Marcet and Nicolini (2003)
2show that stylized facts on hyperinﬂations can be explained when expectations
are formed with a learning process. Sargent (1999) assumes the central bank is a
learner providing an explanation for variations in the inﬂation rate. Orphanides
and Williams (2003) assume that agents are learners and study optimal monetary
policy in such context. Bischi and Marimon (2001) study stability conditions in
a model where agents are learners and monetary authorities pursue an inﬂation
target. Our main model assumes that one part of the private sector are learners
and another part are forward looking. In a similar setup to Bishi and Marimon
(2001), Evans et al (2001) also address the issue of heterogeneous expectations.
Other papers introduce the issue of heterogenous expectations, for instance Gian-
nitsarou (2003) studies a variety of heterogenous forms in a learning framework.
Coupling rational or forward looking agents with learners or backward looking
agents in theoretical models is uncommon, an exception is Evans et al (1993).
The NK model with RE can not properly explain disinﬂation dynamics. How-
ever, there have been attempts to reconcile the NK model with the data. Ball
(1995a) explains disinﬂation dynamics by modelling the central bank to be non-
credible. The credibility approach has only had limited success. Under RE the
private sector can not make systematic mistakes, so on average the private sector
will have correct beliefs about the central bank objectives. Consequently, during
disinﬂations, recessions are as likely as booms, which is a counterfactual obser-
vation. Combining imperfect credibility with staggered price adjustments yields
the prediction that if credibility is suﬃciently low a recession will always occur.
However, even quite credible central banks (e.g. Germany) did not manage to
avoid recessions when pursuing a disinﬂation. The previous observation casts
doubt that credibility alone can explain disinﬂation dynamics.1 Gal´ ı and Gertler
(1999) consider the NK model when the ﬁrms that update prices may compute
optimal prices or simply use a rule of thumb. This formulation introduces a back-
ward looking component in the model’s reduced form. The authors estimate the
parameters in the model concluding that backward looking behaviour is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. In Christiano et al (2001), in periods that ﬁrms do not compute
optimal prices, a rule of thumb indexation is used. The framework of Christiano
et al (2001) and Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) are very similar and can be seen as spe-
cial cases of the model presented in this paper.2 Even though Gal´ ı and Gertler
(1999) and Christiano et al (2001) do not analyze disinﬂations, both models im-
ply that they are costly. Fuhrer (1997) also proposes on empirical grounds a
Phillips curve with forward and backward looking behaviour. The novelty of our
model is that the backward looking mechanism is a learning algorithm which is
suitable for regime changes in general and for a disinﬂation episode in particular.
1See Clarida and Gertler (1997) for further details.
2If one assumes fully rational ﬁrms, Christiano et al (2001) model becomes equivalent to
Yun (1996) model where disinﬂations are costless; that is to say, the crucial assumption is the
departure from RE while indexation is irrelevant.
3The learning algorithm uses the same structural form of RE, being theoretically
more defensible and providing a more robust justiﬁcation of backward looking
behaviour.
There are other proposals in the literature that can explain disinﬂations but
depart from the NK framework. Fuher and Moore (1995) propose a wage contract-
ing model that can account for costly disinﬂations. As Roberts (1998) discusses
Fuher and Moore (1995) framework is also observationally equivalent to a model
where expectations are not fully rational. Mankiw and Reis (2002) consider a
ﬂexible price model where agents form expectations rationally but only revise
them periodically. In such a setting, disinﬂations are costly but the assumption
of ﬂexible prices is crucial. The authors consider that economic agents face a ﬁxed
probability of being able to update their information set. In the NK model, ﬁrms
face a ﬁxed probability of being able to update prices and when doing so ﬁrms al-
ways have the most recent information set. If in Mankiw and Reis (2002) setting
one would assume sticky prices then there would be no diﬀerence from the NK
framework where disinﬂations are costless. It is important to note that the econo-
metric evidence in Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) suggests that there is some degree of
price stickiness and one should not ignore this empirical observation. Ball (1994)
considered a model where prices are not ﬁxed and ﬁrms could choose a predeter-
mined time-varying path for prices until the next adjustment, as in Mankiw and
Reis (2002). Ball (1994) showed that this feature would be an improvement upon
previous speciﬁcations in his paper but remarked that ”...time-varying prices are
not a convincing explanation because they are uncommon in the real world” and
that ”Economists should aim for a theory of disinﬂation that is consistent with
the prevalence of ﬁxed prices.”. The learning algorithm presented in this paper
implies costly disinﬂations with sticky and ﬂexible prices.
Erceg and Levine (2003) build a model to explain disinﬂation dynamics. The
authors assume that wages and prices are determined by staggered four-quarter
nominal contracts, capital is subject to quadratic adjustment costs, and the inﬂa-
tion target is both subject to transitory and persistence shocks. In addition, the
private sector makes use of the Kalman ﬁlter to infer the value of the unobserv-
able inﬂation target. The authors analyze the Volker disinﬂation concluding that
the model can account for the empirical observations in the data. We do stress
that our paper maintains the widely used NK benchmark avoiding building a new
model to explain disinﬂations. Moreover, Erceg and Levine (2003) assumptions
introduce additional degrees of freedom making it easier to match the model with
the data.
Modern macroeconomic models have been reluctant to assume departures
from RE. The common arguments are that too many degrees of freedom are
introduced, agent’s expectations are inconsistent with the model and that expec-
tations formation does not change with policy. We address the previous criticisms
by considering a learning algorithm where no degrees of freedom are introduced.
4The learning algorithm lies in the class with the same functional form of RE and
the only free parameter is made endogenous to the model and to policy. Also the
literature has recognized that during regime changes RE are unrealistic and that
a learning mechanism is more suitable, Clarida et al (1999) sketch the previous
argument and speciﬁcally point out that a disinﬂation is an example of a regime
change that should be analyzed under learning. The most crucial observation that
motivated us to consider a small departure from RE is that the econometric evi-
dence suggests that expectations are not completely rational. Roberts (1998) uses
survey expectations on inﬂation data to show that expectations are not perfectly
rational. The empirical literature does not support the view that expectations are
completely rational but also does not support large deviations from rationality.3
The expectation mechanism employed in the present paper is consistent with the
empirical literature.
3 Description of the model
We use the NK model as derived in Woodford (2003) and ﬁrst suggested by Calvo
(1983). Since the derivation of the model is available in the previous references
we will just describe the reduced form equations. The Aggregate Supply (AS)
curve is given by
πt = κzt + βEtπt+1 + ut (1)
where πt denotes inﬂation, zt denotes the output gap and ut is an iid shock.
It is common to denote the described shock in the AS curve by cost push shock.
The Investment-Saving (IS) curve is described as
zt = Etzt+1 − σ
−1(rt − r
n
t − Etπt+1) (2)
where rt is the interest rate set by the central bank and rn
t is the natural






t−1 + εt (3)
The model is closed with an equation for the interest rate. We will assume a
Taylor rule4 of the type
rt = π
∗ + ϕπ(πt − π
∗) + ϕzzt (4)
where the constant term in the interest rate rule is set to make the inﬂation
target π∗ consistent in equilibrium. Plugging the interest rate rule in the IS
3For further details on this point see Roberts (1998) and the literature reviewed therein.
4For details see Taylor (1993).
5equation and rearranging the system one obtains
yt = a + bEtyt+1 + κr
n
t (5)
where yt = [zt,πt]0, a = 1





σ + ϕz + κϕπ

σ 1 − βϕπ
κσ κ + β(σ + ϕz)

(6)
Taking the results of Blanchard and Kahn (1980), Bullard and Mitra (2002)
ﬁnd that if κ(ϕπ − 1) + (1 − β)ϕz > 0 then there is a unique solution to the
model described in equation 5. Note that Bullard and Mitra (2002) consider a
model where a = 0. If a is a constant matrix, condition (1c) in Blanchard and
Kahn (1980) must be satisﬁed. Since this condition is trivially met, uniqueness
conditions are equivalent.
When the natural interest rate is observed and follows an AR(1) process the
Minimal State Variable (MSV) solution takes the form of yt = A + Crn
t .5 We
assume that economic agents do not know the RE solution but do know the
functional form of the MSV solution. At each moment in time, the private sector
will use the available data to estimate A and C with a learning algorithm; we
denote the estimates obtained at time t of A by At and of C by Ct. Therefore,
at time t the private sector will think that the economy behaves as yt = At +
Ctrn
t , this equation is known as the Perceived Law of Motion (PLM). Given
the estimates of the private sector, expectations are formed as Etyt+1 = At +
Ctρrn
t . Expectations inﬂuence endogenous variables through equation 5. Inserting
expectations in equation 5 and rearranging the terms to ﬁt the functional form of
the MSV solution yields yt = a+bAt+(bCtρ+κ)rn
t . The later equation describes
the Actual Law of Motion (ALM) of the economy. The mapping from the PLM
to the ALM is called the T-map, and in this model it is given by
T(A,C) = (a + bA,bCρ + χ) (7)
where we dropped the time subscripts for convenience. The ﬁxed point in the
T-map is the RE solution, where the PLM and ALM are equal. So, we assume
that agents can not directly solve for RE but know the functional form of the
MSV and using a learning algorithm update At and Ct.
5Usually there is more than one functional form for a solution to a RE model. That is to
say, when solving for RE one ﬁrst imposes a functional form for the solution, and then solves
for the parameters in that functional form. The MSV solution is the functional form capable
of solving the RE model and that has the minimum number of variables. Note that Blanchard
and Kahn (1980) determinacy approach is restricted to the class of MSV solutions. For further
details on MSV solutions see McCallum (1983).
6It is common in the learning literature to analyze if a given solution is E-
stable. The E-stability concept means that at a given ﬁxed point of the T-map
the following equation is locally stable
d
dτ
(A,C) = T(A,C) − (A,C) (8)
Frequently, if a solution is E-stable then the learning equilibrium converges
to the RE solution. Bullard and Mitra (2002) compute the E-stability conditions
for the model where rn
t is an AR(1) process. Interestingly, for our model the
condition for E-stability is equal to the condition for uniqueness.
We still did not describe the way that the parameters are updated, we assume
that private agents use a Recursive Least Squares (RLS) formula given by
φt = φt−1 + αtR
−1




Rt = Rt−1 + αt(xt−1x
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If αt = t−1 RLS is equivalent to Ordinary Least Squares. It is also common
in the literature to assume αt = α, where α ∈ (0,1). Assuming a constant
tracking parameter means that recent observations are given more weight, such
rules may be optimal under regime changes. Later we will consider diﬀerent
tracking parameters for the equations relative to inﬂation and output.
In section 5.2, we will consider the NK model when the natural interest rate
is i.i.d. normally distributed. The appendix shows that, for our purposes, both
cases are similar but when the natural interest rate is i.i.d. convergence is slightly
faster. The MSV solution when rn
t is i.i.d. takes the form yt = [Az,Aπ]0. At time
t agents have a Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) of the type yt = [Az,t,Aπ,t]0 and
so Etyt+1 = [Az,t,Aπ,t]0 inserting the later expectations in the system one obtains
the T-map
T(A) = (a + bA) (11)
It is easy to check that when rn
t is i.i.d. the determinacy and E-stability
conditions are exactly the same as before. In this model the learning algorithm
is simpler. At time t the private sector runs the regressions
Aπ,t = Aπ,t−1 + αt(πt−1 − Aπ,t−1) (12)
Az,t = Az,t−1 + αt(zt−1 − Az,t−1) (13)











Since agents recognize that the MSV solution for inﬂation and the output gap
only depend on a constant the private sector just computes an average of realized
values.
4 Model evaluation
We will analyze how the model behaves during a disinﬂation. We will use the
parameters suggested for the USA by Clarida et al. (2000) where κ = 0.3, σ = 1,
and ρ = 0.35. There is no consensus in the literature on the value of κ, the value
of 0.3 is consistent with Roberts (1995), which used survey expectations in the
estimation procedure. Usually β is set to be a number very close to one, in later
simulations we use β = 1.6 For the interest rate rule we assume ϕπ = 1.5 and
ϕz = 0.5 as in ”the” Taylor rule.7 For these parameters the solution is unique
and E-stable. We assume that at the beginning of the disinﬂation the economy
is at steady state and inﬂation is 15.3%, then the inﬂation target is lowered to
3.7%. These values correspond to ﬁltered inﬂation 1980 ﬁrst quarter and 1984
fourth quarter as can be observed in ﬁgure 1, using other values does not change
the results.8 The NK model is linearized around a zero steady state value of
inﬂation. If one would assume a disinﬂation from 11.5% to 0%, i.e. keeping the
magnitude of the disinﬂation, then the simulated series would only diﬀer by a
constant. In accordance with the previous observation, Ball (1995b) concludes
that the initial level of inﬂation has no clear eﬀect on the sacriﬁce ratio. We
keep the option of a disinﬂation to a non-zero inﬂation target to make the model
dynamics comparable with the Volker disinﬂation.
During the Volker disinﬂation the economy went into recession, as can be seen
by observing the output gap on ﬁgure 2. Figure 3 computes the Federal Funds
interest rate, which rose signiﬁcantly in this period to reduce the inﬂation rate.
Ball (1995b) reports a sacriﬁce ratio for the Volker disinﬂation using quarterly
data of 0.018. The sacriﬁce ratio is computed as the sum of the annualized output
gap divided by the change in inﬂation. For the data series presented in this paper,
6This option was also taken in Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Ball (1994). In practical terms,
setting the discount factor to unity makes a zero output gap consistent with a steady state value
of inﬂation above zero. Results presented later in the paper are very similar if one considers
β = 0.99 , as in Clarida et al.(2000).
7Clarida et al. (2000) present evidence that the Taylor principle was satisﬁed during a time
period that contains the Volker disinﬂation.
8The data appendix contains the description of the data series used throughout the paper.
8and treating as zero the observations where the output gap is positive, the sacriﬁce
ratio is 0.006. Ball (1995b) computations of the sacriﬁce ratio pretend to identify
the relative costs of diﬀerent episodes in a systematic way. The author draws
attention that the sacriﬁce ratio is extremely sensitive to the output gap measure
and the assumptions used.9
For exposition purposes we will evaluate the model when the entire private
sector behaves as learners, our main model will be presented in a later section. We
set the standard deviation of the cost push shock and the innovation in the natural
interest rate to be 0.02. In ﬁgure 4, we plot the average inﬂation and output gap
generated by 5000 simulations of the model for (αinf = 0.5,αout = 0.5), ﬁgure 5
computes the interest rate. Even though, we allow our learners to use diﬀerent
tracking parameters for the equations relative to inﬂation and relative to output it
is optimal for them to use the same value of 0.5. Qualitatively the model accounts
well for what one would expect, inﬂation is reduced sluggishly converging to the
new target and in the short run the economy experiences a recession. Doing the
symmetric experience, i.e. raising the inﬂation target, inﬂation rises sluggishly to
the target while the economy experiences a boom. As Mankiw and Reis (2002)
emphasize, in the NK model under RE an unanticipated credible disinﬂation
results in an immediate reduction of inﬂation and there are no output costs. It
is usually inferred that price stickiness is translated to inﬂation stickiness but
such inference is not correct. However, as this section shows once learning is
introduced in the NK model, transition dynamics become similar to the data. The
drawbacks of this ﬁrst model is that convergence is too slow and that expectations
are completely backward looking.
In order to obtain a more precise notion of convergence we will report some
statistics. We will run the model 5000 times and compute the mean of all realiza-
tions. Firstly we will report the ﬁrst time period when mean inﬂation and mean
output gap diﬀer by less than 0.005 from their steady state levels. Secondly, we






where N is the total number of simulations, xt,n is the n-th realization at a
9Indeed Ball (1995b) computes the output gap in an ”extreme” way, the author assumes
that trend output grows log-linearly from the start of the disinﬂation to the end plus four
quarters. The output gap is the diﬀerence from log-output to trend output. The justiﬁcation
of the author is that at the peak inﬂation, the change in inﬂation is zero and the natural level
of output is often deﬁned as the level consistent with stable inﬂation. The author also assumes
that output is back at its trend only 4 quarters after the trough in inﬂation. Even though, these
deﬁnitions do serve the authors purposes of identifying the relative costs of disinﬂations they
must be taken with care when considering these values as an absolute measure. As a matter
of example, by assuming that trend output grows log-linearly from peak to trough the sacriﬁce
ratio drops to 0.012.




n=1[(xt,n − ¯ xt)2 + (¯ xt − x∗)2 + 2(xt,n − ¯ xt)(¯ xt − x∗)]
N
(17)
where ¯ xt is the mean value across realizations at time t. The third term is
zero and for large enough t one expects the second term to be very small. We
will report the computations for t = 16 and t = 100. For the previous model and
for N = 5000, the following table summarizes convergence statistics.
out inf
t = 16 t = 100 t = 16 t = 100








N 0.0375 0.0246 0.0431 0.0222
t : ¯ xt − xt < 0.005 36 37
Table 1
At t = 16 average inﬂation and average output are still far from steady state,
while at t = 100 the series are quite close to steady state. The fourth row in
the table shows that variability around the mean is quite similar for t = 16 and
t = 100. The fourth and ﬁfth rows are very similar for t = 100, this is because
mean values are very close to the steady state. The sacriﬁce ratio assuming that
the disinﬂation lasts 16 and 20 quarters is 0.012 and 0.014 respectively. These
results broadly conﬁrm that convergence is relatively slow when compared with
the Volker disinﬂation. In a later section, we will consider a model where some
agents are learners while others are forward looking. Such model will converge
faster and in line with the data. The next subsection determines the consistent
tracking parameters.
4.1 Learning speed
At this stage, our main uncertainty relates to the vector of the tracking para-
meters α = (αinf,αout). To make α endogenous we will employ the concept of
Internal Consistency (IC) ﬁrst introduced by Marcet and Nicolini (2003). Before
introducing the formal concept we need some notation. Let yt(α) denote the
values generated in the economy when economic agents use α as tracking para-
meters, Eα0
t yt+1(α) denote the expected value at t of yt+1 when all agents in the
economy use α as tracking parameters and the predictions are made using α0. So,



























That is to say, α is internally consistent if all economic agents use it and
predictions made by these tracking parameters are ”good enough” when compared
with predictions made by other tracking parameters α0. We chose the time horizon
to be 20 quarters, which is the duration of the Volker disinﬂation episode. We
computed results for ε = 0.00001 which approximately corresponds to 2% of the
total MSE for output and inﬂation when the tracking parameters are (αinf =
0.5,αout = 0.5). Expectations on equation 18 are computed by Monte Carlo
integration using 500 simulations. Even though it is common to assume a unique
tracking parameter, during the disinﬂation the private sector may realize that
the output gap is more stable than the level of inﬂation, hence the private sector
may choose diﬀerent tracking parameters for output and inﬂation.10 We present
results for inﬂation in ﬁgure 6 and for output in ﬁgure 7. The horizontal axis
represents the tracking parameters (αinf,αout), and the vertical axis represents
(α0
inf,α0
out). In ﬁgure 6 a value of 1 means that condition 18 is met, a value of
0 means that (α0
inf,α0
out) is ineﬃcient given that all agents use (αinf,αout). If a
1 occurs in the diagonal it means that (αinf,αout) is internally consistent. By
examining ﬁgure 6 one can see that when agents predict inﬂation the internally
consistent tracking parameters are 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9 no matter what the tracking
parameter for output is. In the last column, one can see that 0.5 predicts well
more often. By examining ﬁgure 7, when agents only predict output the optimal
values are always 0.5. The parameters found in our analysis are higher than the
values that the literature usually assumes, the main reason is that the large bulk
of the literature does not focus on regime changes. The appendix on the learning
speed analyzes in further detail the consistency criteria and provides sensitivity
analysis.
5 Rationals and learners
5.1 Motivation of the model
Up to now, we have analyzed an economy inhabited solely by learners, which use
past data to form expectations. The econometric evidence from surveys shows
10For the estimation of the variance-covariance matrix the private sector is assumed to use a
low tracking parameter of 0.05. It is optimal for learners to do so because even with the regime
change the steady state values of this matrix are not altered. Assuming other values for the
variance-covariance matrix tracking parameter does not change the results.
11that expectations incorporate more information than the one contained in past
data. Note that α was determined using the IC requirement making our learners
not to be purely backward looking agents. Nevertheless, we will build a model
where a proportion of the private sector clearly forms expectations using more in-
formation than the one contained in past data. In a simpliﬁed version, we consider
that a proportion of the private sector is completely rational. In a more elaborate
model, we introduce a simpliﬁcation that enables an explicit solution but where
a proportion of the private sector is forward looking although not completely
rational. Introducing agents with forward looking behaviour makes aggregate
expectations to have both an adaptive and a forward looking component as it is
observed in survey data.
The literature has proposed models, on empirical grounds, where the private
sector has both backward and forward looking behaviour. Even though the ca-
pability of explaining disinﬂations has not been explicitly studied, such setups
imply costly disinﬂations. In the model that we present in this section, part of
the private sector uses a learning algorithm. In fact, this introduces a foundation
for backward looking behaviour, i.e. if agents do not have suﬃcient knowledge
to compute RE, they can still use available data optimally to form expectations.
Doing so, backward looking behaviour is introduced. During the disinﬂation,
using a consistency criterion we determine endogenously the optimal tracking
parameter, leaving no free parameters.
5.1.1 Comparison with previous models
We will ﬁrst analyze both the evidence suggested in Roberts (1997,1998), Gal´ ı and
Gertler (1999) and Christiano et al (2001) as special cases where heterogeneous
learning rules are followed by the private sector. After having established the
link between these papers and our approach we will develop a theoretical model
where both learners and forward looking agents coexist.
Remember that in our model with no autocorrelated shocks, inﬂation expec-
tations are given by
Etπt+1 = Et−1πt + αinf(πt−1 − Et−1πt) (19)
Considering a constant tracking parameter and solving backwards one can






Roberts (1997,1998) analyzes the following equation to describe the evolution
of inﬂation expectations
Stπt+1 = P(L)πt−1 + [1 − P(1)]Mtπt+1 (21)
12Survey expectations Stπt+1 are assumed to be a weighted average between
rational (or Mathematical) expectations Mtπt+1 and lagged values of inﬂation,
where P(.) is a polynomial and L is the lag operator. Roberts (1998) says that
this equation is a fairly good description of the Livingston and Michigan survey on
inﬂation expectations. Note that if one would say that agents form expectations






j(πt−1−j) + (1 − ψ)Mtπt+1 (22)
or allowing for varying tracking parameters
Stπt+1 = ψP(L)(πt−1) + (1 − ψ)Mtπt+1 (23)
A diﬀerence of minor importance between equation 23 and Roberts (1997,1998)
approach is that a priori we expect the polynomial P(L) to place less weight on
older inﬂation data. A bigger diﬀerence is that the weight on rational expecta-
tions is (1 − ψ) and not 1 − P(1). Interestingly, Roberts (1997) concluded that
the weight 1 − P(1) was not a convincing estimate.
Roberts (1998) also proposes another equation for the formation of expecta-
tions
Stπt+1 = ψSt−1πt + (1 − ψ)Mtπt (24)
If we would consider the coexistence of trackers and rationals we could write
Stπt+1 = ψ [St−1πt(1 − αinf) + αinfπt−1] + (1 − ψ)Mtπt+1 (25)
So indeed the two equations are very similar. The only diﬀerence is that
Roberts (1998) does not include in his equations last period inﬂation which the-
oretically should be given a small weight.11 From this discussion we can see that
the analysis of Roberts (1997,1998) can be rethought to be close to our framework
where trackers and rationals coexist.
Clarida et al (1999) also point out that the NK Phillips curve is somewhat
at odds with the data but that the following generalization of the IS and AS
equations provide better outcomes
πt = kzt + τπt−1 + β(1 − τ)Etπt+1 (26)
zt = θzt−1 + (1 − θ)Etzt+1 − σ
−1(rt − r
n
t − Etπt+1) (27)
11We considered before αinf = 0.5 but if a regime change is not in place the optimal α will
be very small. In fact, α = t−1 becomes optimal when there are no regime changes.
13where τ,θ ∈ (0,1). Once again these equations are similar to our framework,
the above equations do assume that a proportion of agents follow adaptive expec-
tations Etπt+1 = πt−1 and others follow rational expectations. Considering our
suggested framework we would write
πt = kzt + βτα(L)πt−1 + β(1 − τ)Etπt+1 (28)




t − τα(L)πt−1 − (1 − τ)Etπt+1) (29)
In practical terms it is the AS equation that is subject to empirical tests and
since in empirical framework it is often assumed that β = 1, our AS equation is
a generalization of the standard backward-forward looking AS curve.
Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) argue correctly that the NK Phillips curve already
assumes a relationship between marginal cost and the output gap. When deriving
the NK Phillips curve an intermediate step yields an equation with marginal costs
πt = ζmct + βEtπt+1 (30)
Using this equation it is shown that known problems in the literature with
the NK Phillips curve disappear. The authors address the issue that some ﬁrms
may have adaptive expectations and estimate the following equation
πt = ζmct + γbπt−1 + γfEtπt+1 (31)
where γb + γf = 1 if β = 1. The authors conclude that the fraction of ﬁrms
with backward looking behavior is smaller than the ones with forward looking
behavior, but statistically signiﬁcant. So once again the results of Gal´ ı and Gertler
(1999) suggest that the New Keynesian model has both adaptive and rational
expectations. Christiano et al (2001) assume that the ﬁrms that do not optimize
prices adjust them using a rule of thumb, that is prices are indexed to previous
period inﬂation. The model in reduced equation is very similar to equation 31,
with γb = γf = 0.5. Yun (1996) proposed a model of indexation assuming
fully rational expectations. While Christiano et al (2001) model has several nice
properties with respect to inﬂation persistence, Yun (1996) model does not; that
is to say the crucial hypothesis is not indexation but the departure from RE.
According to Roberts (1998) the proportion of backward looking agents is
estimated to be between 0.2 and 0.4 depending on the set of instruments used
and the sample period. According to Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) the weight on
backward looking behaviour is also estimated to be between 0.2 and 0.4.
5.2 A theoretical model of learning and rational expecta-
tions
In the previous section we showed that the coexistence of backward and forward
looking agents has strong empirical support. This section analyzes the NK model
14with i.i.d shocks when both learners and rationals coexist. Assuming that learn-
ers use a constant tracking parameter as in our disinﬂation simulation, this model
allows for an explicit solution for rational agents.
The model in reduced form yields
yt = a + bEtyt+1 + κr
n
t (32)
but now assume that aggregate expectations are a weighted average between
expectations of Learners and Rationals
Etyt+1 = ψE
L
t yt+1 + (1 − ψ)E
R
t yt+1 (33)
Agents, that follow tracking, form their expectations as
E
L
t yt+1 = E
L
t−1yt + α(yt−1 − E
L
t−1yt) (34)
Now we assume that a ﬁxed proportion of agents are completely rational and
therefore they do know how learners form expectations and the proportion of
learners and rationals in the economy.
In order to solve the rational agents problem we conjecture that the MSV
solution takes the form




yt+1 = A + BE
L
t+1yt+2 (36)
yt+1 = A + B(E
L
t yt+1(1 − α) + αyt) (37)
Since ER
t yt+1 = A + B(EL
t yt+1(1 − α) + αyt) the ALM will be
yt = a + bψE
L
t yt+1 + b(1 − ψ)A + b(1 − ψ)B(E
L




yt = (I − b(1 − ψ)Bα)
−1[(a + b(1 − ψ)A)]+
+ (I − b(1 − ψ)Bα)
−1[(bψ + b(1 − ψ)(1 − α)B)E
L
t yt+1] (39)
So to solve for RE we need to consider the following two equations
A = (I − b(1 − ψ)Bα)
−1(a + b(1 − ψ)A) (40)
B = (I − b(1 − ψ)Bα)
−1(bψ + b(1 − ψ)(1 − α)B) (41)
15The second equation is a quadratic matrix equation on B that can be solved
using the generalized eigenvalues method.12 After computing B solving for A is
a trivial problem.
The MSV solution changed when we introduced rational agents. Adaptive
learners could then realize that their expectations are taken into account by
rationals ... so learners should think that rationals know what they think. This
would make learners to estimate a diﬀerent MSV and in its turn rationals would
estimate again another MSV and ... this problem would be taken to inﬁnity. To
avoid this complication we will show that if learners behave as if the rationals did
not exist then their expectations do converge to an equilibrium. For this economy,
stability conditions under tracking can be computed by examining directly the
learning algorithm.13 The learning algorithm is
E
L
t yt+1 = E
L
t−1yt + α(yt−1 − E
L
t−1yt) (42)
Using equations 39-41 the equation just described can be written as
E
L
t yt+1 = (I(1 − α) + αB)E
L




The previous system will be stable as long as the matrix (I(1 − α) + αB)
has eigenvalues with absolute value smaller than one. The asymptotic mean
of expectations is Ey = (I − B)−1A which corresponds to the RE equilibrium
[0,π∗]. The asymptotic variance is vec
P
= (I − (I(1 − α) + αB) ⊗ (I(1 − α) +
αB))−1vec(α(I−b(1−ψ)Bα)−1κσ(α(I−b(1−ψ)Bα)−1κ)0). Using the normality
assumption for rn
t one concludes EL
t yt+1 ∼ N([0,π∗],
P
).
So, in this model aggregate expectations are somewhat backward looking
which makes a disinﬂation to be costly, but rational private agents become aware
that a regime change occurred. Rational agents are aware that not everybody
is rational and predict inﬂation and the output gap accordingly. If ψ = 0 then
rational agents predict that inﬂation goes immediately to its new target and that
no recession occurs. On the other hand, if the proportion of learners is nearly
one then rationals should predict as learners do.
We assume that the weight on backward looking behavior is 0.3, which is the
midpoint in the results of Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) and Roberts (1998). In our ﬁrst
model, the consistent tracking parameters were estimated to be αinf = αout = 0.5.
Nevertheless, the presence of rational agents could change the consistent tracking
parameter, for the time being let’s assume the same tracking parameters.14 For
the parametrization presented before and considering that ψ = 0.3 and α = 0.5
the learning algorithm is indeed stable. Figure 8 plots a 5000 average for the paths
12For a discussion see Uhlig (1999)
13This approach closely follows Evans and Honkapohja (2001) section 3.3.
14We will skip the internal consistency analysis for this model. The reason is that the model
in the next subsection is a more elaborate version of this one and we will proceed to internal
consistency analysis therein.
16of inﬂation and the output gap, ﬁgure 9 plots the interest rate.15 Convergence is
faster as the number of rational agents and the tracking parameter increase. The
following table presents convergence statistics, which show that the introduction
of rational agents accelerates convergence.16
out inf
t = 16 t = 100 t = 16 t = 100








N 0.0208 0.0208 0.0248 0.0249
t : ¯ xt − xt < 0.005 8 10
Table 3
5.3 Learners and near rationals
In the last section, the fact that agents were only predicting a constant for output
and inﬂation made the analysis of coupling learners and rationals easier. It is
possible to extend the framework where learners and rationals coexist to more
complicated models, but in principle one has to recur to numerical techniques to
do so. The technical diﬃculty with fully rational agents is that when predicting
future variables, rational agents must take into account the learners’ expectations
formation process. Once learners estimate more than an average an explicit MSV
where a ﬁxed point exists is not so easily obtained. In addition, when a numerical
solution is used one can not analytically prove long run convergence properties.
In this paper we opt to introduce a simplifying assumption that will enable an
explicit solution. We make the assumption that rationals do not update the way
learners think when predicting future variables, for future reference we will denote
these agents as near rationals. Near rationals will still be aware of regime shifts
and if these agents would be the sole inhabitants of our NK economy disinﬂations
would still be costless.
In this section we will assume again that the natural interest rate is autocor-
related, as it is standard to assume in the NK model. If learners proportion in
the economy is given by ψ then the economy would now be described by
yt = a + bψE
L
t yt+1 + b(1 − ψ)E
R
t yt+1 + κr
n
t (44)
15We assume that two shocks aﬀect the economy, one shock aﬀects the AS equation and the
other the IS equation. The standard deviation of both shocks was set to be 0.02.
16The appendix examines convergence for an economy with i.i.d. shocks but only populated
with learners.














where variables with R upper script are variables for near rationals and vari-




tations for near rationals are formed as ER





i.e. the way that learners think is not taken to evolve. So plugging these expec-
tations back in the ALM yields
yt = a + b(1 − ψ)A




+ (b(1 − ψ)C
Rρ + κ)r
n






The solution must satisfy AR = (I − b(1 − ψ))−1a, BR = (I − b(1 − ψ))−1bψ,
CR = (I − b(1 − ψ)ρ)−1κ, DR = (I − b(1 − ψ)ρ)−1bψρ. The way that this
problem was solved ensures that once learners converge to RE equilibrium so
do near rationals. Hence, the relevant question to be posed is whether learner’s
expectations will converge to equilibrium.
The relevant T-map is
T(A
L,C
L) = (a + b(1 − ψ)A




Rρ + b(Iψ + (1 − ψ)D
R)C
Lρ + χ) (47)
The ﬁxed point in the T-map is
A
L = (I − b(Iψ + (1 − ψ)B
R))
−1(a + b(1 − ψ)A
R) (48)
C
L = (I − b(Iψ + (1 − ψ)D
R)ρ)
−1(κ + b(1 − ψ)C
Rρ)) (49)
The ﬁxed point for AL and CL corresponds to the RE equilibrium, namely
AL = [0,π∗]. This result is not surprising, it means that the presence of near
rationals does not alter the long run behavior of the economy.
E-stability is obtained if the matrices b(Iψ +(1−ψ)BR)−I and b(Iψ +(1−
ψ)DR)ρ−I have all eigenvalues with negative real parts. The previous conditions
can be written as BR − I, DR − I.














The previous matrices have all eigenvalues with real parts smaller than one,
hence the ﬁxed point is E-stable.17
17Evans and Honkapohja (1998) showed that E-stability implies local convergence of the
18We conducted the internal consistency analysis for this economy, the details
of the analysis are presented in the appendix. We present results in ﬁgures 10
and 11, which have a very clear interpretation. For inﬂation, αinf = 0.5 is always
optimal. For output, αout = 0.3, is always optimal. The optimal value for output
is lower in this model compared to the ﬁrst model in this paper. The reason is
that near rationals make the economy go to its new steady state relatively fast
and hence recession is not as sharp, making the output gap more stable.
With the consistent tracking parameters at hand we can assess how far from
rationality near rationals are. The former agents do commit prediction errors
during the disinﬂation episode, systematically over-predicting inﬂation. We sim-
ulated the model 5000 times and computed average realizations and average pre-
dictions by near rationals. During the ﬁrst 25 periods after the beginning of the
disinﬂation, average prediction error is 0.15% for output and 0.34% for inﬂation.
Prediction errors are bigger for initial periods, being the maximum error 1.48%
for inﬂation at period 3.18 Note that as learners expectations converge to the
new equilibrium near rationals mistakes are reduced. The Survey of Professional
Forecasters shows that during the Volker disinﬂation even Professional Forecast-
ers made systematic prediction mistakes as near rationals do in this model.
Figure 12 plots the average paths of inﬂation and output gap for this economy
under the disinﬂation episode considered previously, where αout = 0.3 and αinf =
0.5. Figure 13 plots the interest rate and ﬁgure 14 plots a typical realization.
The sacriﬁce ratio assuming the disinﬂation lasts for 16 and 20 periods are 0.0054
and 0.0056 respectively, a value quite similar to the computations in this paper
but lower than the estimates of Ball(1995b). The economy where learners and
near rationals coexist converges in line with the data. There is still a temporary
recession while inﬂation gradually moves to target, more importantly convergence
is not too slow. The following table supports the previous claim.
learning algorithm in a class of models that contain the NK framework. The diﬀerence between
this economy and the NK framework are the matrices that constitute the T-map. Evans and
Honkapohja (1998) results can be applied to the model presented in this section. Also note
that when the economy converges, as it is assumed in the E-Stability concept, near rationals do
not commit mistakes, being completely rational. Convergence conditions under recursive least
squares and tracking are not always the same; simulation based results suggest that if agents
use a tracking algorithm the economy also converges to equilibrium.
18We considered the ﬁrst 25 periods where rational agents would not commit mistakes, i.e.
predictions for period 3 to 27. The error prediction for period 2 (ER
1 y2 − y2) is equal for
rationals and near rationals since the disinﬂation is unanticipated. From period 2 to period
3 the coeﬃcients for learners change the most causing the biggest prediction error for near
rationals. At period 3 average inﬂation is 10.19% and the average prediction (ER
2 y3) is 11.67%.
19out inf
t = 16 t = 100 t = 16 t = 100








N 0.0214 0.0208 0.0194 0.0187
t : ¯ xt − xt < 0.005 15 15
Table 4
Figure 15 plots aggregate expectations of learners and near rationals for next
quarter versus current and one quarter ahead series. The prediction error is the
vertical distance between the expectation for next quarter and one quarter ahead
realizations. So the model implies that there is a systematic overprediction of
inﬂation. The Survey of Professional Forecasters is the only survey that reports
one quarter ahead expectations, unfortunately only the predictions for the GNP
deﬂator cover the entire period of the Volker disinﬂation.19 Figure 16 computes
one quarter ahead expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters versus
current and one quarter ahead inﬂation. For most of the disinﬂation period, ex-
pectations systematically overpredict inﬂation as is implied by the present model.
Moreover, ﬁgure 16 also shows that, in periods of rising inﬂation, expectations
underpredict inﬂation; hence the overall picture is consistent with some degree of
backward looking expectations.
6 Conclusions
Building on the results of Marcet and Sargent (1989c), this paper analyzes the
NK model under a disinﬂation when part of the private sector forms expectations
using a learning algorithm. The NK model under RE is not able to account for
the observed inﬂation persistence when an unanticipated credible disinﬂation is
under way. This paper shows that when learning is introduced in the NK model,
transition dynamics during an unanticipated disinﬂation become consistent with
the data. Assuming that the private sector learns is specially suited for regime
changes since RE unrealistically assume that the private sector expectations catch
up immediately. Moreover, the learning mechanism uses the same functional form
of RE providing a foundation for backward looking behaviour. Using the internal
consistency requirement makes tracking parameters to be endogenous, leaving no
free parameters in the expectations formation process.
Evidence from surveys on inﬂation expectations conclude that expectations
are neither purely backward looking nor purely forward looking. To incorporate
19In the data the diﬀerence between the GNP deﬂator and the GDP deﬂator is almost im-
perceptible.
20the previous observation we assumed that, an empirically plausible, small pro-
portion of the private sector is not forward looking during the regime change.
Aside from the empirical appeal of our formulation we show that the advantages
also spill over to a theoretical formulation. Even though learning is suitable to
analyze regime changes, convergence is usually too slow under this assumption.
Our empirically consistent heterogenous framework solves this problem since a
part of the private sector still learns but convergence is not too slow. In addition,
our model generates persistence in inﬂation and a recession, which are patterns
observed during the Volker disinﬂation.
We make an important contribution to the literature by showing that learning
techniques can be useful to describe transition dynamics. We managed to explain
disinﬂation dynamics with the widely used NK model as our benchmark, we thus
avoid introducing arbitrary features into the model to achieve our goal. Moreover,
our results do not hinge on speciﬁc assumptions; we used the NK framework and
our results also carry over to a less appealing ﬂexible price model. Hence, this
paper suggests a robust explanation for disinﬂation dynamics in general and for
the Volker disinﬂation in particular.
21Figure 1: Inﬂation
Figure 2: Output Gap
Figure 3: Federal Funds interest rate
22Figure 4: Learners economy - output and inﬂation.
Figure 5: Learners economy - interest rate.
23Figure 6: Internal Consistency Table for inﬂation - Learners.
Figure 7: Internal Consistency Table for output - Learners.
24Figure 8: Learners and Rationals economy - output and inﬂation.
Figure 9: Learners and Rationals economy - interest rate.
25Figure 10: Internal Consistency Table for inﬂation - Near Rationals.
Figure 11: Internal Consistency Table for output - Near Rationals.
26Figure 12: Learners and near rationals economy
Figure 13: Learners and near rationals economy
27Figure 14: Learners and near rationals economy - Typical Realization
Figure 15: Model expectations - Near Rationals.
28Figure 16: Survey of Professional Forecasters GNP deﬂator expectations
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31A-1 Appendix on the role of shocks
This appendix will analyze whether a bigger variance in the shocks lead to a faster
convergence to the new equilibrium; in addition we will also analyze convergence
diﬀerence between an economy with i.i.d. shocks and autocorrelated shocks.
Carroll (2003) reports that when more news about inﬂation are available,
expectations of the general public catch up faster with expectations of professional
forecasters. More news of inﬂation are likely to be correlated to an higher inﬂation
variance. It is known that when there is more variability in the regressed variables
the estimators become more precise, on the other hand variability on the error
term leads to smaller precision. In an economy of learners bigger precision may
imply faster convergence. So in an economy with i.i.d. shocks the bigger variance
of the error term is expected to be translated into a lower convergence speed. If
the shocks are not i.i.d., since shocks are also a regressor, the eﬀect should be
mixed.
Time of convergence α = 0.1 α = 0.3 α = 0.5 α = 0.7 α = 0.9
No shocks output 157 53 32 23 18
inﬂation 161 54 33 24 18
st.d.=0.01 output 0 0 0 0 0
inﬂation -1 0 0 +1 +1
st.d.=0.02 output -2 -1 0 +1 0
inﬂation -1 0 -1 -1 +1
Table I: Convergence time for an economy with i.i.d. shocks
Time of convergence α = 0.1 α = 0.3 α = 0.5 α = 0.7 α = 0.9
st.d.=0.01 output +5 +4 +4 +4 +4
inﬂation +4 +4 +4 +3 +4
st.d.=0.02 output +5 +5 +4 +4 +4
inﬂation +4 +4 +4 +3 +4
Table II: Convergence time for an economy with correlated shocks
The previous tables show that an higher variance of shocks does not lead to
an increase in the time of convergence.20 The ﬁrst two rows in table I display
the time of convergence for diﬀerent tracking parameters. All the other values
in table I and II display the time of convergence diﬀerence with respect to the
20We considered that the economy had converged when inﬂation minus the inﬂation target
was less than 0.005 and the output gap was less than 0.005. For the stochastic economy, 5000
realizations of the series of shocks were simulated; the convergence criteria is the same but for
average inﬂation and average output gap across all realizations. As in section 5.2, for table I
two uncorrelated shocks are assumed to inﬂuence the ALM directly. As in section 5.3, for table
II a correlated natural interest rate and an uncorrelated cost push shock are assumed.
32non-stochastic economy. One can see that higher variances have no eﬀect on
convergence. Table II shows that when shocks are autocorrelated convergence is
slightly slower.
A-2 Internal Consistency Appendix
We conducted sensitivity analysis considering alternative values of T; for T=16
and T=24, being these values still plausible for our purposes, the results remain
unaltered. Smaller values of ε lead to a smaller number of ”good” predictors but
the results are mainly unchanged.
Note that the magnitude of shocks inﬂuences the prediction performance of
tracking parameters. Insofar as there is a regime change it is optimal to give more
importance to recent observations, this is precisely what high tracking parameters
do. On the other hand, shocks create noise in the economy, and if one gives more
importance to recent observations then predictions will be harmfully inﬂuenced
by recent shocks. We ﬁrst considered that besides the autocorrelated natural
interest rate there is a non-autocorrelated cost-push shock. We also did sensitivity
analysis by considering the presence of other shocks, being the results robust. In
the alternative speciﬁcation we considered that both the IS and AS equation could
be inﬂuenced by non-autocorrelated shocks. We do not assume that the shocks
are correlated because the correlations between the output gap and inﬂation are
inﬂuenced in this time period by the disinﬂationary episode.
We estimated the data standard deviation of the output gap and inﬂation
from 1980 to 1984 to be 0.02 and 0.04. We set the magnitude of shocks so that
for the internal consistent tracking parameter the model yields plausible variances
when compared with the data during the Volker disinﬂation.
A-2.1 Learners’ model
We ﬁrst guessed that (αinf = 0.5,αout = 0.5) will be internally consistent. As-
suming (αinf = 0.5,αout = 0.5), we computed the variance of the shocks that
would yield plausible variances in the model. We considered the standard de-
viations for the natural interest rate innovation and the cost-push shock to be
0.02; for 500 realizations and over 20 quarters the average standard deviation of
output is 0.023 and of inﬂation is 0.033. When we considered that besides the
natural interest rate two non-autocorrelated shocks were present we could adjust
the standard deviations in the model to match perfectly the standard deviations
in the data, doing so the main results did not change.
A-2.2 Main model
To determine the internally consistent tracking parameters we ﬁrst guessed that
αinf = 0.5 and αout = 0.3 are the best internal consistent parameters. We assume
that the natural interest rate is autocorrelated and there is a cost-push shock.
Dropping the cost push shock and considering other uncorrelated shocks (as we
33did in our ﬁrst model) does not change the results. We set the standard deviation
for the cost-push shock and the innovation in the natural interest rate to be 0.02.
If the tracking parameter for output is 0.3 and for output is 0.5, for an average
of 500 simulations and for a range of 20 periods, the average standard deviation
for output is 0.023 and for inﬂation is 0.036. As before we choose the time range
T to be 20 quarters and ε = 0.00001, being the results robust to other values of
these parameters.
A-3 Data Appendix
All variables refer to the USA. Inﬂation was computed using the seasonally ad-
justed monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all urban consumers and all
items. The source is the United States Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor
Statistics and the series code is CPIAUCSL. Quarter inﬂation is computed as the
sum of the months in the quarter divided by the sum of the CPI of the months of
the previous quarter. The reported series were ﬁltered using the band pass ﬁlter
eliminating components with periodicity smaller than 4 quarters.21
The series for Gross Domestic Product at constant prices and seasonally ad-
justed is the oﬃcial series of the Federal Reserve System. A ﬁrst series was
computed by eliminating the components with periodicity smaller than 32 quar-
ters. A second series was computed by eliminating components smaller than 4
quarters. The output gap is computed by the log of the second series divided by
the ﬁrst series.
The federal funds interest rate source is the Federal Reserve System. The
monthly annualized rates were transformed to quarterly annualized rates using a
geometric average.
The Survey of Professional Forecasters reports the mean values for the GNP
deﬂator prediction for the current quarter and the following quarter. Expected
inﬂation is computed as the annualized change from the current quarter prediction
to the next quarter prediction. The GNP deﬂator source is the Federal Reserve
System.
21For a description of the band pass ﬁlter see Baxter and King (1999).
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